When Gamenauts released Ninja Fishing, a game built on the same cast-reel-shoot chain as Vlambeer’s Flash game Radical Fishing, it was downloaded by the millions. Vlambeer was a two-person studio at the time, and the iOS version of their game — eventually Ridiculous Fishing — had been in production since December 7, 2010. The clone arrived about a year later. The iOS game shipped on March 13, 2013.
The story is usually told as an ethics lesson about cloning. That’s a real story, and Vlambeer’s 2012 GDC talk on the subject reportedly received a standing ovation. But the more useful lesson for small teams is a design one. The clone didn’t just take Vlambeer’s mechanics. It forced them to find out which parts of their game were load-bearing and which parts were merely okay — and then to throw out the okay parts.
The cost, in the developers’ own words
Mike Rose’s March 2013 Game Developer feature, “Ridiculous Fishing: The Game that Nearly Ended Vlambeer,” is the most detailed primary account of what the clone did to the studio. Rami Ismail told Rose that when the clone hit, his full-time job became handling the fallout, and Jan Willem Nijman took over Serious Sam: The Random Encounter. Development on Ridiculous Fishing stalled: “We didn’t work on Ridiculous Fishing for about a year — maybe a few days every now and then,” Ismail said.
The damage went beyond lost time. Ismail described creativity as “not a solid something. It’s pretty fragile. It’s not an infinite resource that you can just tap into.” He said the period nearly ended Vlambeer because “we realized that we weren’t able to be Vlambeer” — a studio that was, by its own definition, prolific. They canceled a large planned project after realizing they wanted a project to work on rather than that specific project.
This is the part of the story that gets skipped when the ending is a hit. The clone didn’t just create a competitor. It broke the studio’s working identity for roughly a year.
The turning point: gutting the game
The recovery, as Rose documents it, involved a five-day road trip from Seattle to New York that the team called “The Week of Hatred.” Ismail, Nijman, Zach Gage, Greg Wohlwend, and Mike Boxleiter drove together with the stated possibility that they might have a good time or might end up hating each other forever. The sources place the trip and the redesign in sequence; they don’t establish that the trip caused the decision. What is documented is what happened after: the team gutted the game.
Ismail’s description of the state of the project is precise and worth reading closely:
“At that point, the fishing felt great, but the shooting didn’t feel so right. We had a store that worked, but it wasn’t great, and people didn’t know they had to go there. Everything was there, but it was all convoluted, mixed up, disjointed…”
And then the decision:
“We decided that the shop was garbage, the interface was garbage, the endgame was garbage… a lot of stuff was okay, but ‘okay’ wasn’t what we were aiming for, so we threw out 90 percent of what we’d done.”
“Okay” was the failing grade. That’s the sentence to underline. A small team under competitive pressure usually responds by adding — more content, more features, more marketing. Vlambeer’s response was subtraction, and the subtraction was only rational because they could name what they were subtracting around.
The irreducible loop
What survived the purge was a feedback chain that Radical Fishing had already proven. Ismail laid it out for Rose in plain terms:
“If you do well in the descent stage, you’ll do better in the reeling-in stage; if you do better in the reeling-in stage, you’ll do better in the shooting stage; if you do better in the shooting stage, you’ll be able to buy more stuff — and then you’ll be better at the descent stage. Thus it goes round and round. It’s one giant feedback loop.”
He added that this loop was “what made the game interesting for cloners” in the first place. That’s a striking admission: the thing a clone can copy is the mechanic, but the thing that makes the mechanic worth playing is the tightness of the chain between its stages. A clone can reproduce the stages. It has to reproduce the tightness on its own.
The redesign was organized around protecting that chain. The store, the interface, and the endgame were rebuilt because they were the parts that either fed the loop or failed to. The fishing felt great and stayed. The shooting didn’t feel right and was reworked. The store “worked” but people didn’t know they had to go there — a loop failure, not a content failure.
“An IAP game without IAPs”
The most transferable phrase from the interview is Ismail’s description of the design target: “it’s like we’re making an IAP game without IAPs.” He was explicit about the intent — take the good things from free-to-play reward cadence, make sure “the feedback loop is as tight as possible,” make sure players are constantly rewarded, and refuse the monetization. Ridiculous Fishing shipped with no in-app purchases.
This is a design pattern, not a moral position. Free-to-play games are engineered around reward frequency because retention depends on it. A premium game can borrow that engineering and let the loop itself carry retention. The risk is that the loop becomes a treadmill; the discipline is that every reward has to feed back into the descent stage rather than into a store screen the player doesn’t know exists.
Post-launch: the knife
The clearest small example of the loop-first discipline came after release. Polygon reported that version 1.1 of Ridiculous Fishing added a knife the player can use to cut the fishing line and instantly restart an attempt. Vlambeer’s framing: “No longer will you have to wait until the line comes all the way back up just trying to catch that one last fish.”
Read that as a patch note about dead time. The loop was already validated; the knife removed a stretch of waiting that sat between the player and the next iteration of the loop. It added no new system. It made the existing system faster to re-enter. For a small team, that’s the highest-leverage kind of post-launch change: subtract friction from the thing you’ve already proven, rather than adding surface area you now have to balance.
The reusable pattern
Stripped of the specific game, the Vlambeer response to the clone looks like this:
- Name the irreducible loop before you cut anything. Vlambeer could throw out 90 percent of the work because they could state the descent → reel → shoot → upgrade → descent chain in one sentence. If you can’t state your loop in one sentence, you’re not ready to decide what to keep.
- Grade systems against the loop, not against “working.” The store worked. It was still garbage, because working isn’t the bar. The question is whether a system feeds the loop or merely sits next to it.
- Treat a clone as a live test of what matters. A competitor shipping your mechanics is evidence about which parts of your design are copyable and which parts depend on execution. That’s information, even when it’s unwelcome information.
- Borrow reward cadence, refuse the monetization. The “IAP game without IAPs” framing is available to any premium game. Tighten the reward frequency; keep the loop as the retention mechanism.
- After launch, remove dead time before adding systems. The knife is the model. Find the waiting between the player and the next loop iteration, and cut it.
A hypothetical for solo developers
This is my recommendation, not a report of what Vlambeer did. If you’re a solo developer and a competitor has shipped something uncomfortably close to your design, try a one-week scrap test before you decide anything else. List every system in your project. Mark the ones your core loop actually depends on to function — not the ones that make it nicer, the ones without which the loop doesn’t close. Build or play a version with only the marked systems. If the loop still works, you’ve found your irreducible core and you can grade everything else against it. If the loop doesn’t work, you’ve found the real problem, and it isn’t the clone.
The Vlambeer case doesn’t prove that out-designing a clone produces a hit. The sources don’t support a causal claim like that, and the studio’s own account is messier than the ending suggests — a year of stalled work, a broken sense of identity, a canceled project. What the case does show is a decision procedure: when the competitive pressure arrives, name the loop, grade every system against it, and be willing to call “okay” a failure. The clone is the forcing function. The redesign is the response.
FAQ
Did Vlambeer sue Gamenauts over Ninja Fishing?
The retrieved sources do not document litigation or a legal threat. Game mechanics were not eligible for copyright protection, which is the commonly cited reason clones of this kind were not pursued legally. This article makes no claim about Vlambeer’s legal considerations beyond what the sources state.
Did Ridiculous Fishing outsell Ninja Fishing?
The retrieved sources do not provide comparable sales or download figures for the two games. Ninja Fishing was described as being downloaded by the millions; Ridiculous Fishing received critical acclaim and an Apple Design Award. No commercial comparison is supported here, and the argument in this article does not depend on one.
What was the “Week of Hatred”?
It was a five-day road trip from Seattle to New York that Ismail, Nijman, Gage, Wohlwend, and Boxleiter took together, as described in the Game Developer feature. The sources place the trip before the decision to gut the game; they do not establish that the trip caused the redesign.
What did the 2012 GDC talk actually argue?
The GDC Vault pages for Vlambeer’s talks were unavailable at the time of writing, so this article does not characterize the talk’s content beyond noting that it addressed the cloning situation and was widely reported as receiving a standing ovation. The design argument here rests on the Game Developer interview, not on the talk.